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THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX: P OVERTY, 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND 
LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM 
H award F. Chang* 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the 2000 Census, the foreign-born population in the 
U nited States reached 31.1 million, representing 11.1% of the total  
U .S. population.1 This percentage is the highest that the United 
States has experienced since 1930, when 11.6% of the total U.S .  popu­
lation was foreign born.2 In 1970, the foreign-born population was 
only 9.6 million, or only 4.7% of the total population.3 The rapid ex­
pansion of the foreign-born population in the intervening t hree de­
cades reflects high levels of immigration into the United States,4 
which in turn reflects the liberalization of U .S .  immigration laws since 
1965." Some observers have reacted to these data with alarm, noting 
that the sheer number of immigrants now residing in the United States 
is "by far the most ever recorded. ''n The restrictionist Center for Im­
migration Studies (CIS), for example ,  notes that the foreign-born pop­
ulation grew by 11.3 million between 1990 and 2000, and that " [t]he 
foreign-born population's growth rate in every decade since 1970 has 
been higher than at any other time in history. "7 
The absolute number of immigrants, howeveL is far less important 
than their share of the total U.S.  population. Our ability to absorb 
immigrants into our society and our labor market depends on the rela-
Professor of  Law. University of  Pennsylvania Law School. Copyright© 2003. Howard F. 
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I. See U.S. CENSl.'S BL'REAU. U.S. DEP.T OF CoM�lERCE. CENSUS 2000 PROFI LE : U.S. Suivl­
�Ir\RY 3 tbl.2 (20U2). 
2. See li.S. CENSUS BL:I{EAL'. U.S. DEI'T or Cmvii\lF.RCE. PRoFILE OF THE FoREIGN-BORN 
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3. See id. 
-L See id. at 2. 
5. See id. <:�t X-9. 
6. STF\F:" A. Cr\iV!AROTA. CENTER FOR li\tlvl!CiRATION STliDIES. li\!MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED 
STATEs- 2002. at -1 (2002). 
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tive sizes of the native and immigrant populations .  Viewed from this 
perspective, the number of immigrants in the U nited States today is 
fairly moderate compared to levels experienced during much of our 
past. In fact, from 1860 to 1920, the foreign-born population fluctu­
ated between 13.2% and 14.8% of the total U.S. population .8 This 
percentage fell steadily from 1920 to 1970 as a result of restrictive im­
migration legislation enacted in 1921 and 1924, which established the 
national origin quota system that remained in place until 1965.9 From 
a historical perspective , i t  is this period of low immigration and a 
shrinking foreign-born share of the U.S .  population that represents an 
aberration and a departure from our tradition of liberal immigration 
laws. The recovery of the foreign-born population from the low point 
of 1970 merely reflects a return toward the levels that prevailed over 
much of our nation's history. to 
Restrictionists, however, are disturbed by not only the quantity of 
immigrants in the United  States but also their quality. The Census 
Bureau reports that according to data from the March 2000 Current 
Population Survey, the proportion of the population age twenty-five 
and older who had failed to complete high school was higher among 
the foreign born (33.0%) than among natives (13.4% ) . 1 1 The foreign 
born from Latin America were especially likely to have less than a 
high-school education (50.4%), and 66.2% of those from Niexico had 
less than a high-school education.12 "There is no single better predic­
tor of economic success than education," notes the CIS, "and the fact 
that so many adult immigrants lack a high school degree means their 
income, poverty rates, ... and other measures of economic attainment 
are likely to lag far behind natives." 1 3 
Not surprisingly, the Census Bureau also found that the foreign 
born in the United States have lower earnings as full-time workers 
and lower median household incomes than natives.14 The Census Bu­
reau reports that the poverty rate for the foreign born was 16.8%, 
while the poverty rate for natives was 11.2%Y5 Poverty rates were 
8. See U.S. CENsus B uREA U. supra note 2. at 9 fig.l-1. 
lJ. See id. at 8-9. 
10. The foreign-born share of the U.S. population is also moderate compared to the corre­
sponding share in other countries of immigration. In 1990. the foreign born represented 17% of 
the total population of Canada and 23% of the total population of Australia. See NATIONAL 
RESEARCH CouNCIL. THE NEw AMERICANS: EcoNorvric. DEMoc;RAPHIC. AND FisCAL EFFECTS 
oF frvtMIGRATION 63 tbl.2.11 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eels .. 1997) [hereinafter NRC] . 
11. See U.S. CENsus BuREAU. supra note 2. at 36. 
12. Sec id. at 37. 
13. C Ai'viAROTA. supra note 6. at 11. 
14. Sr:e U.S. CENsus BuREAU. supra note 2. at 5-6. 42-45. 
15. Sr:e id. at 46-47. 
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higher still for the foreign born from Latin America (21.9%) and high­
est for those from Mexico (25.8% ). 16 In light of such data, restriction­
ists are especially concerned about immigration from Mexico . 1 7  
Furthermore , census data indicate that despite a $3000 increase in 
national median household income over the past decade 10  and a de­
crease in poverty nationwide . 19 median household income fel l  and 
poverty increased in areas in Southern California and in the New 
York metropolitan area, with high rates of immigration of the foreign 
born.20 Some observers conclude that "something is going wrong. ''2 1 
Economists and demographers suggest that immigration helps to ex­
plain the patterns observed in these data .22 This suggestion raises the 
questions: Should we find these trends troubling? Does it suggest that 
immigration is causing poverty? Should we therefore restrict the im­
migration of the poor? Should we reject proposals to make more 
visas available for unskilled alien workers? 
In this Article, I argue that the immigration of unskilled workers 
poses a fundamental problem for liberals. In Part I, I suggest that this 
immigration produces benefits for natives in the labor market with 
little evidence of adverse effects on native workers. In Part II, how­
ever, I turn to concerns about the fiscal burden that poor immigrants 
might impose on the public treasury, and I suggest that the optimal 
16. See id. at 47 fig.lCJ-2. 
17. See ST E VEN A. CAMAROTA. CENTER FOR IMrvtiGRATION STUDIES, l!'vtrvtiCoR.<\TION FROi\t 
:viE:\ leo: AssEssrNG THE IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES (2001 ). 
1 K. See Janny Scott. Census Finds Rising Tide. and 1\llany Who 1\tlissed Soul. N.Y. TrMES. June 
1 7. 2 002. at 8 1. 
lY. See Peter Y. Hong. The US. Census; Dura Reflecrs Sowhland's Highs. L01vs. LA. TrMES. 
June 5. 2002. pt. 2. at l (reporting that 13.1% of individuals in the United States lived in poverty 
in 1%9, whereas 12.4% lived in poverty in 1999): Peter T. Kilborn & Lynette Clemetson. Coins 
ofi.)(J's Did Nor Lifi All, Census Shows. N.Y. TIMEs. June 5. 2002. at AJ (reporting that 10% of 
all U.S. families lived in poverty in 1989. whereas 9.2% lived in poverty in 2000). 
20. See Sean GilL California Children L iving in Poverrv Rose bv 430,000 in "90s, Survey SluMs. 
L.A. TrMES. Mar. S. 200.2. pt. A. pt. 1. at lK (reporting increase in number of California children 
living in poverty): Hong. supra note 19. at 1 (reporting increased poverty in the Los Angeles 
area): Peter Y. Hong d al.. Southland's At•erage Family lncnme Droppe(/ in the '90s. LA. TrrvrEs. 
May i 5. 200::::. at pt. A. pt. l (reporting rising poverty and falling median income in Los Angeles 
County): Daryl Kelley. Ventura Counr_v; High-Tech Buom Offser hv Rise in Povert_v. L.A. TrMEs. 
May i5. 2002. pt. 2. at 1 (reporting rising poverty in California's Ventura County): Scott Martelle 
& Erin Chan. Income Drop in '90s Cut o Broad Swath. Daw Shmv. L.A. Tr!\rEs. Aug. 27. 2002. pt. 
2. at 1 (reporting increased poverty and declining median household income in Los Angeles 
County): Scott. supra note IS.  at Bl (reporting a fall in median household income in parts of the 
New York mc:tropolitan area and in parts of Southern California): Janny Scott. Manlzauanires 
Fared Best in Netv York City in 1990's. N.Y. TriVJES. May 24. 2002. at 84 (reporting rising poverty 
and falling median family income in Queens. Brooklyn. and the Bronx). 
2!. Hong ct al.. supra note 20. at l (quoting economist Heather Boushey). 
22. See. e.g .. Hong. supra note 19. at 1: Martelle & Chan. supra note 20. at l: Scott. supra note 
lo. at B l: Scott. supra note 20. at 84. 
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response from the perspective of the economic welfare of natives 
would be to admit these aliens as guest workers with limited access to 
public benefits. In Part III, I note how this response would violate 
liberal egalitarian ideals. These ideals would treat these resident 
workers as equals, entitled to access to citizenship and to the full set  of 
public benefits provided to citizens. In Part IV, I outline how this 
liberal stance can produce an anomaly: If the welfare of a l l  incumbent 
residents determines admission policies, and we anticipate the fiscal 
burden that the immigration of the poor would impose , then our wel­
fare criterion would preclude the admission of unskil led workers in 
the first place . Thus, our commitment to treat these workers as equals 
once admitted would cut against their admission and make them 
worse off than they would be if we agreed never to treat them as 
equals. In Part V,  I argue that a liberal should avoid this anomaly by 
adopting a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to all 
individuals, including aliens, which suggests liberal immigration poli­
cies for unskilled workers. Finally, in Part VI, I conclude that the 
problem with this escape from the ''immigration paradox'' is the fail­
ure of most citizens to adopt such a cosmopolitan perspective. As 
long as citizens are reluctant to bear the fiscal burdens that cosmopoli­
tan liberalism would impose, constraints of political feasibility may 
imply that guest-worker programs are the best policies that cosmopol­
itan liberals can obtain with respect to many unskilled alien workers. 
I .  THE EFFECTS OF UNSKILLED IMMIGRATION 
IN THE LABOR MARKET 
One common source of concern is the impact of the immigration of 
unskilled workers on the wages and employment opportunities of sim­
ilarly unskil led natives. The CIS. for example ,  has expressed this con­
cern regarding unskilled immigration from :N1exico. claiming that this 
immigration has harmed the poorest and most vulnerable native 
workers.23 If immigration reduces the wages of those natives who 
must compete with unskilled immigrants in the labor market, then this 
effect would produce a more unequal distribution cf income among 
natives. 
Studies of the effects of immigration in U.S .  labor markets, how­
ever, have shown little evidence of effects on native wages or employ­
ment . Surveys of this empirical literature indicate that immigration 
2.1. See Cr\f\.1.'\ ROTA. supra note 17. at 21-23. 27-28. 
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has a weak effect on the employment of natives .24 Furthermore. the 
evidence indicates a weak relationship between native wages and im­
migration across all types of native workers. white or black , skilled or 
unskilled. 25 
\Vhy do immigrants have so little adverse impact on the wages and 
employment of natives? One reason is  that the demand for labor does 
not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant 
workers not only supply labor. for example,  they also demand goods 
and services, and this demand will translate into greater demand for 
locally supplied labor. This increase in demand can offset the effect of 
increased supply. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants and 
natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market.26 Thus , immi­
grants often do not compete for the same jobs as natives.  Indeed, 
immigrant labor can be a complement rather than a substitute for na­
tive labor, so that an increase in the supply of immigrant labor will 
increase the demand for native labor and thus have positive effects on 
native workers rather than negative effects. In fact, labor markets are 
highly segregated, with immigrant labor concentrated in some occupa­
tions while natives are concentrated in others_27 
If immigration has little impact on the wages and employment of 
native workers , then why do we observe rising poverty and declining 
incomes in areas where the foreign born immigrate? TI1e high rates of 
poverty may simply reflect the influx of poor immigrants themselves 
and the impact that they have on the composition of the local popula­
tion rather than any adverse impact on the incomes of those already 
here.20 Indeed, the lower levels of skill and education among immi­
grant workers makes it all the less likely that they will serve as good 
24. See, e.g .. George J. Borjas. The Economics of lmnzigration. 32 J. EcoN. Ln. 1667. 16l)K 
(ll)lJ4): Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt. Tlze Impact of lnznzigrants on Host Countrv 
Wages. Employnzent und CrOJvtlz. J. EcoN. PERSP .. Spring 19Y5. at 23. 42: NRC. supra note 10. at 
25. See, e.g . . Borjas. supra note 24. at 1697: Friedberg & Hunt. supra note 24. at 42: NRC. 
supra note 10. at 223. 
26. See Jean Baldwin Grossman. The Suhstiwtuhilitv of Nuril·es and Immigrants in Production. 
64 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 596 (lYK2). 
27. See NRC. supru note 10. at 21R. 
28. See Martelle & Chan. supra note 20. at Bl (quoting demographer Dowell Myers. who 
notes that "immigrants came in at the bottom of the ladder 
.. 
in California. which "worked to 
drop average income"): Scott. supra note 18. at Bl ("'AS low-wage workers poured in from 
places like Central America in pursuit of a better life. the midpoint on the income spectrum in 
some places with large foreign-born populations may have ... inched down."): Scott. supra note 
20. at 84 ("While immigrants may have been making more than they did before they came. 
many were also making less than many of the native-born New Yorkers who moved out of the 
city in the I Y9<rs.''). 
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substitutes for native workers and makes it correspondingly less l ikely 
that they will have an adverse impact on native workers. 
On the contrary , immigrant workers are likely to benefi t  natives 
through their effects on our labor markets.29 Even if wages may fall 
for some workers who compete with immigrant labor, this loss for 
those workers is a pure transfer: it is offset by an equal gain for those 
who employ labor, and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods 
and services at lower cost .3° Furthermore, we enjoy additional gains 
from employing immigrant workers: we gain surplus in excess of what 
we pay immigrants for their labor. If we did not gain any surplus from 
employing immigrants, we would not hire them. Thus ,  natives as a 
group enjoy a net gain .J1 
Furthermore , the immigrants themselves gain by immigrating and 
obtaining higher wages than they would have enjoyed in their home 
countries.32 Labor migration represents a form of international trade 
in which the source country exports labor to the host country.33 Like 
international trade in goods, labor migration allows foreign suppliers 
to sell their services to domestic buyers, allowing both parties to enjoy 
gains from trade as a result of the transaction. Tnus, the increase in 
poverty and the decrease in median incomes in areas where the for­
eign born immigrate are consistent with increasing incomes for both 
natives and immigrants.3-+ 
29. See NRC supra note 10. at 135-53. 
30. See Scott. supra note 1?\. at B l (quoting economist Edward N. Wolff. who observes that 
.. [fjor every investment banker. you have one or two delivery men to feed them during their long 
working hours 
.. 
so that "in a sense. the high-income group in the city also creates this low­
income group 
.. 
in a .. symbiotic relationship .. ) .  
31. George Borjas has attempted a rough calculation of the size of the surplus enjoyed by 
natives in the United States as a result of immigration. using a variety of assumptions. See 
George J. Borjas. The Economic Beneflrs ji-um lmmigrarion. J. EcoN. PERSP .. Spring 1995. at 3. 
5. Assuming a homogeneous supply of labor. for example. Borjas estimates that immigration 
into the United States has produced a surplus of $7.000.000 per year. See id. at 7. 
32. Unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. for example. have reported receiving wages in the 
United States nearly nine times what they receive in Mexico. See ivlr:xicun Df;)(>rfees Reporr 
Good 7inllmenr. UNITED PRESS INT.L. Apr. 21. 1996. available ar LEXIS. Ncxis Library. UPl 
File (reporting that t\ilexican immigrants received an average of $278 per week in the United 
States. compared with $30.81 per week in Mexico). 
33. See Howard F. Chang. i\1igrmion as lnternwional Trade: Tl1f Econamic Gains .fimn rhe 
Liheruli::ed !v!m·enzenr of Labor. 3 UCLA J. INr'L L. & FoREIGN AFF. 371 (199�-99). 
34. See Hong. supra note 19, at 1 (quoting demographer Dowell Myers. who states: .. Because 
there·s a high percentage of poor. does that mean you'll become poor if you move to L.A.? No. 
Does it mean the economy is not performing well'? No .
.
. ): Kelley. supra note 20. at 1 (not­
ing. despite increasing rates of poverty in Ventura County. quality of life may be improving for 
the poor immigrant \vorkers who live there): Scott. supra note 18. at B l (quoting economist 
Gary Burtless. who notes: .. When you have a lot of people entering from the rest of the world. 
and many of them enter at the lower rungs of the wage distribution. then you can have a situa­
tion where everyone is prospering and the median income is declining .
.. 
).  
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Is there any reason for natives to be worried about the influx of 
poor immigrants and the resulting increase in inequality in the United 
States? Are natives better off when unskilled workers immigrate? 
The answer depends on not only effects on the private sector through 
the labor market but also effects on the public sector through taxes 
and public entitlements. Much of the debate over the effects of immi­
gration upon the welfare of natives has focused on the question of 
whether immigrants pay more in taxes than they consume in public 
benefits.35 
The Census Bureau reports that the foreign born not only have 
higher rates of poverty but also are more likely to participate in 
means-tested programs than natives. While 21.2% of households 
headed by foreign-born householders received food stamps, housing 
assistance, or Nledicaid benefits , only 14.6% of households headed by 
natives participated in one of those programs.36 Similarly, while 8.0% 
of households headed by foreign-born householders received Tempo­
rary Assistance for Needy Families, General Assistance, or Supple­
mental Security Income, only 5.6% of native-headed households 
participated in one of those programs.37 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that unskilled immi­
grants on average have a net negative impact on natives through their 
effects on the public treasury. The National Research Council (NRC) , 
for example, found in 1996 that the average immigrant with less than a 
high-school education impose d  a net fiscal cost of $13,000, even after 
taking into account the fiscal benefits that the immigrant's descend­
ants would confer in the future .38 Does this negative fiscal impact sug­
gest that we should exclude unskil led aliens through restrictive 
immigration laws? 
A better alternative from the perspective of the economic welfare 
of natives would be to admit unskilled aliens to our l abor market with­
out granting full access to public benefits. That is, the optimal re­
sponse to fiscal concerns would not be exclusion but less restrictive 
alternatives designed to eliminate the fiscal burden that these immi­
grants impose on natives .  That is , if unskilled immigrants have a nega­
tive effect on the public sector, the optimal response is not restrictive 
immigration laws. Rather, the appropriate response is fiscal. Restric-
35. See, e.g .. CAMAROTA. supra note 17. at 35-4l. 53-54: NRC supra note 10. at 254-362. 
36. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAU. supra note 2. at 48-49. 
37. See id. 
38. See NRC. supra note 10. at 334 tbl.7.5 (reporting net present value of average fiscal im­
pacts in 1 996 dollars). 
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tions on alien access to public benefi ts, for example ,  can improve the 
fiscal impact of immigration without excluding unskilled immigrants 
from the U.S .  labor force. Exclusion is the more costly response for 
both natives and immigrants, because it excludes immigrants not only 
from our public benefits but also from our labor market and thereby 
sacrifices the gains from trade that we and they would otherwise 
enJoy. 
The obj ective of reducing the burden  that immigrants impose on  
natives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access 
of aliens to various entitlement programs. Current U.S .  laws, for ex­
ample, generally exclude non-immigrants. including temporary work­
ers, and unauthorized immigrants from a broad range of public 
benefits: with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for 
"any Federal public benefit . ''3<) Current law also includes restrictions 
on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent re­
sidents, to federal entitlement programs.-w The N RC estimated that 
by excluding legal immigrants from various means-tested benefits for 
their first five years in  the United States, welfare legislati on  enacted in 
1996 would improve the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant 
by $8000.41 
While legal immigrants can gain full access to public benefits upon 
naturalization, only aliens "admitted for permanent residence·· may 
naturalize as U.S. citizens.-1.2 Aliens admitted on non-immigrant visas 
only. including temporary guest workers, are not admitted as perma­
nent residents and are thus not e ligible for most public enti tlements 
and not eligible to naturalize. Therefore , even if fiscal concerns justify 
restrictions on access to permanent residence for unskilled workers, 
these concerns cannot j ustify restrictions on their access to non-immi­
grant visas. A truly temporary worker, for example , would remain in 
the United States only while employed and would then return home, 
imposing even less of a burden on the public treasury than a perma­
nent resident.43 The empir ical evidence indicates that immigrants are 
likely to make a positive contr ibution to the public treasury through 
the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a burden 
only if they remain in the United States for their retirement years and 
39. 8 U.S.C. * 16ll(a) (2000). 
40. See id. *§ 1612. 1613. 
4l. See NRC. supra note 10. at 339 (reporting net present value of fiscal impact in 1996 
dollars). 
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000). 
43. See Alan 0. Sykes. The Welfare t."cono111ics of Immigration Llllv: A Thmrericul Survev 
1virh an Analysis of U.S. Policy. in JusTICE IN lMMICiRATION 158. l�l) (Warren F. Schwartz ed . . 
1995). 
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gain access to public benefits .44 Thus, guest workers admitted on non­
immigrant visas, even if unskil led, are likely to have a net positive 
economic impact on natives, and there is little reason to restrict their 
entry. This observation suggests that the optimal policy from the per­
spective of native economic welfare is to admit unskil led workers as 
guest workers rather than exclude them. 11uough guest-worker pro­
grams. natives enjoy the benefits of unskilled alien workers in the la­
bor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of providing the full set 
of public benefits that these workers would enjoy if they were to gain 
access to permanent residence and ultimately citizenship. 
III. GuEST vVoRKERS AND LIBERAL EGALITARIAN IDEALS 
In fact, the expansion of our guest-worker programs appeared to be 
a priority on the political agenda while President George W. Bush 
weighed proposals to expand access to such visas,45 until terrorist at­
tacks placed these plans on hold.46 The question is hardly moot , how­
ever, and we may see some liberalizing reforms proposed in the near 
future, now that the Bush administration has resumed negotiations 
with Mexico on immigration policy with the support of Democrats in 
Congress .47 Should we expand our guest-worker programs? 
The alternative to a guest-worker program for many migrant vvork­
ers is probably entry as an unauthorized immigrant .  In fact, employ­
ment-based immigration of unskilled workers into the United States 
has largely taken the form of illegal rather than legal immigration . 
Legalization of unauthorized  immigrants through an expanded guest­
worker program would serve the interests of these immigrants. These 
workers would gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and 
life as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to 
deportation by the government and to abuse by employers. 
Critics of guest-worker programs commonly complain that guest 
workers often prefer to stay permanently and that it can be difficult  to 
ensure that these workers leave .-+K We could accommodate the desire 
44. See NRC. supra nott: lO. at 315 fig.7.9. 
45. See Dar1 Eggen & Helen Dewar. Bush H'eighing Plan fin iv/exicwz Guest \.-\iorkers. WASH. 
PosT. July 25. 200 l. at A3. 
46. See Alfredo Corchado. Immigration Talks Between U.S .. Mexico on Hold. DALLAS l\tloRN­
ING NE\VS. Sept. 19. 20tH. at 5A: tv·like Doming. Mexico Border !s.1ue on Hold. CHI. TR!H . .  Sept. 
21.2001. at 16. 
47. See iVlary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan. U.S. and ivlexico to Resume Talks on !mnzigruriun 
Po!icv. WAsH. PosT. Nov. 15. 20fll. at A40: Ginger Thompson. '/(![' Dnnucml.\ Po/irick Through 
Rum! ivle.rico. N.Y. TiMES. Nov. 1 Y. 2001. at Al2. 
4�. See Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum. Tile ,\1iruge of ;'v!exicun Guesr H'orkcrs. 
FoREJC;N AFF . . Nov./Dec. 21l0 l. at 117. 119-20. 12-1-25. 
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of guest workers to remain here by l ifting restrictions on the duration 
of a guest worker's residence and employment in the United States. 
As long as we restrict their access to public benefits for a sufficient 
period of time, they seem unlikely to impose a net fiscal burden on 
natives:+9 
Such a program, however, raises the prospect of de facto permanent 
residents with only restricted access to citizenship and to public bene­
fits .50 Liberal obj ect ions to this prospect account for some of the po­
litical resistance to expansion of these guest-worker programs. James 
Woodvvard objects that '' [t]he creation of a class of permanent re­
sidents who are restricted from becoming citizens ( if they should wish 
to do so) or any similar system of differential status among a state's 
permanent inhabitants is fundamentally incompatible with liberal 
egalitarian ide als. ''5 1 
For example , consider the liberal theory of j ustice developed by 
John Rawls, who asks what principles people would choose behind a 
"veil of ignorance . ''52 In this ''original position, '' people know nothing 
about their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "they do not 
know how the various alternatives will affect t heir own particular case 
and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of gen­
eral considerations. "53 This condition ensures that the parties are 
"fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons. "54 Rawls in­
cludes all persons within a single society, which he defines as "a coop­
erative venture for mutual advantage ," as participants in the original 
position.55 Rawls concludes that principles of distributive justice 
49. Recall that the NRC found that an immigrant with less than a high-school education im­
poses a net fiscal cost of only $ 13.000. and that if the 1996 welfare legislation excludes immi­
grants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the United 
States. then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant would improve by $8000. See NRC. 
111pru note lli. at 334. 339. 
50. See Sergio Munoz. Jorge CasWnedu: !'vfexico 's /vlwz Ahroud. L.A. TI;vrEs. Aug. 12. 2001. at 
M3. 
51. James Woodward. Commenrury: Liberalism and !V!igrurion. in fR.CE MovEMENT: ETHICAL 
IsstrEs :N Tilt:: TRANSNATION.'\L MIGRATION OF PEoPLE AND oF MoNEY 5lJ. �2 (Brian Barry & 
Robert E. Goodin eels . . 1992). The communitarian Michael Walzer adopts a similar position. 
See MICHAEl. vVALZER. S PHERES OF ]LISTICE: A DEFENSE or PUIR,\l.ISIVI AND EQLfALITY 56-o 1 
( 19�3) (arguing that guest-worker programs are inconsistent with political justice in a democratic 
state). 
52. See JoHN RAWLS. A T�!i':OR">' oF JUSTICE l36-,.f2 ( 1971 ). 
53. !d. at 136-37: see ulso id. at 141 (''If a knowledge of particulars is allowed. then the out­
come is biased by arbitrary contingencies."). 
54. ld at 141. 
55. M at 4. 
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would require members of this society to maximize the wel fare of 
those who are least advantaged.-"'6 
Thus, l iberal ideals suggest that our obligations of distributive jus­
tice extend to workers who participate in a scheme of social coopera­
tion with us. From this perspect ive , we cannot limit these obligations 
to natives alone. This  perspective suggests that if we admit workers to 
our l abor market, we must extend the benefits of ful l  membership to 
them as well .  From this perspective. by admitting unski l led workers, 
we make them objects of our concern and thus vvorthy recipients of 
the ful l  set of public benefits that  we provide to natives. We would 
then take a broader view of national economic welfare : our welfare 
objectives would include the welfare of not only natives but also 
immigrants . 57 
IV. THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX 
By the same token, however, by excluding al iens from our labor 
market and our society, we can avoid the obligations that we would 
incur by admitting them. Rawls assumes that the " boundaries · ·  of his 
principles "are given by the notion of a se lf-contained national com­
munity. "58 Similarly, Woodward argues in favor of applying Rawls 's  
framework to " inhabitants of a particular country" and rejects the 
suggestion that Rawls 's  principles of j ustice apply · ·globally. " 5 '-J  
This moral stance, however, produces an anomaly. If our admission 
policies are based only on the interests of natives and immigrants al­
ready here , then we would refuse to admit poor immigrants because 
we would anticipate the public benefits that they would consume and 
the fiscal burden that they would impose on incumbent residents .  
Thus, our commitment to treat them as equals once admitted would 
cut against their admission and make them •.vorse off than they would 
be if  we rejected such a commitment. That is .  by agreeing to obliga­
tions of distributive justice toward them if admitted ,  we harm them .  
These a liens would be better off i f  we  agreed never to care about their 
welfare and never to treat them as equals .  If concern for the welfare 
of poor immigrants motivates generous fiscal policies toward them, 
then it  seems perverse to cite these policies  as a reason to exclude the 
56. See id. at 75-83. 
57. See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T.N. Srin ivasan .  On r!w Choice Be/Ween Capital and Labor 
N!ubility .  14 J .  IN-r" L EcoN . 209. 2 i 2  ( 1 SJK3 ) ( . . [O ]nce labour  crosses nat ional  borders. we have w 
worry about which country's welfare it ought to be incl uded in . . . .  [W]e need to consider the 
possibi l i ty that it may be regarded. after  immigra tion. to be part of one's o w n  welfare . . . ) . 
58. RAWLS. supra note 52.  at 457.  
59.  Woodward. supra note 5 1 .  a t  75:  see u!su id. at 75-R l .  
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very immigrants whose welfare we would seek to improve through 
these policies. This moral stance is unsatisfactory from the standpoint 
of human welfare .  The liberal who prevents a poor alien from escap­
ing extreme poverty while citing principles of justice and equality for 
that alien seems vulnerable to the charge of "superstitious ' rule wor­
ship . ' .
, 
that is . . . the charge of heartlessness, in his apparently prefer­
ring abstract conformity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable 
human suffering. " 60 
It seems incoherent public policy to turn away the poor immigrant, 
citing a negative effect on the welfare of current residents ,  given that 
we always have the option of admitting the poor immigrant subj ect to  
restrictions on access to public benefits. This option would improve 
the we lfare of both the poor immigrant and the welfare of current 
residents. This admission would also transform the poor immigrant 
into a resident ,  however, and if our social welfare criterion includes 
the welfare of al l  residents , then the same distributive concerns that 
justified generous policies for other poor residents would apply to the 
poor immigrant as well. In short, no measure of social  welfare that 
counts an individual's welfare if and only if the individual i s  a resident 
can provide a coherent criterion for immigration policies ,  because 
these policies determine the identity of the population of residents. 
This moral stance harms the very individuals whose welfare we 
\vould invoke as the basis for their access to citizenship and public 
benefits. TI1is paradox lies at the heart of immigration policy .  A com­
mitment to treat the immigrant as an equal can backfire against the 
alien seeking to immigrate , because the immigrant's access to t his 
equal status does not arise unless we admit the immigrant .  If  the act 
of admission triggers obligations of j ustice, then we can avoid these 
obligations by choosing to exclude .  Indeed, if admission polices are 
determined by the interests of only incumbent residents, we would be 
obliged to exclude unskilled al ien workers. This stance begs the ques­
tion of whether we can legitimately base admission policies on the 
interests of incumbent residents alone. 
Unless the admission decision itself also respects the alien as an 
equaL the result is perverse . Thus, the source of the immigration par­
adox is the contingent nature of the obligation to treat the alien as an 
equal. That is, this problem is inherent in making obligations of j us­
tice contingent on voluntary acts of cooperation .  This approach al­
lows us to avoid obligations of justice by refusing to employ poor 
60. J .J C.  Smart. A n  Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics. in J . J.C. SMART & BERNARD 
W t L L J .-\ \t;; .  ll l t ut A R ! AN Jstvt:  FoR AND AG.'>. tNST 3 .  6 ( 1 973) .  
2003] THE l!vJ!vJJGRATION PARADOX 77 1 
aliens. If we refuse to admit aliens, then we owe them no explanation 
within the framework that Rawls proposes for deriving principles of 
j ustice . This approach reconciles the exclusion of aliens with egalita­
rian principles of social j ustice only by fiat: it assumes the result rather 
than deriving it .6 1  
We cannot begin our normative ana lysis by assuming that we do not 
admit the aliens in question. As the example of immigration policy 
demonstrates, the question of which individuals we choose as partners 
in cooperation is itself an open question of public policy that we may 
want to answer using our principles of j ustice. If we make obligations 
of j ustice contingent on whether we admit them in the first place , then 
this normative framework becomes a function of our policies and can­
not work as an independent standard that we can use to evaluate 
these policies. 
That is, i f  admission to our l abor market implies status as a constitu­
ent and as a member of our society, then the set of individuals whose 
welfare we seek to promote becomes an endogenous function of our 
admission policies. By choosing our members, we also choose our 
moral obligations and our welfare obj ectives. If our obligations de­
pend on our admission policies ,  however, then they can no longer pro­
vide independent criteria for a normative analysis of  those admission 
policies. Our analysis becomes circular: we are justified in discrimi­
nating against aliens in employment precisely because our refusal to 
hire them relieves us of the obligations of j ustice that we would owe 
equals. Such a theory begs the question of whether our choice of part­
ners is itself justifiable .62 
V. CosMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM 
We can avoid the immigration paradox if we instead adopt a welfare 
objective that is independent of our policy choices. Two options pre­
sent themselves. First ,  we can choose a welfare objective that favors 
the interests of natives and discounts the interests of immigrants. As 
we saw, this nativist perspective suggests guest-worker programs as 
6 1.  Thus. critics of this approach complain that it is "an arbitrary move which cannot be de­
fended within the t heory."  BRIAN BARRY. THE LI BERAL THEORY O F  J usTICE 129 ( 1 973). 
62. Thus. the fact that  cooperation is feasible should be sufficient to require the inclusion or a 
prospective party to the original position. See C harles R. Bei tz. Cosnwpo!irwz fdettfs and Na­
rional Senrim enl. �0 J. PHIL. 5 9 1 .  595 ( 1 983) ( arguing that otherwise. · · l imiting the scope of the 
p rinciples to national societies on the grounds that in t ernational cooperation dues not exist to­
day . . .  woul d  arbitrarily favor the status quo") . 
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the optimal immigration policies for unskilled aliens.63 Second,  we 
can adopt a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to 
all individuals, including aliens. Either alternative provides a criterion 
that is independent of our admission policies and thus avoids the cir­
cularity that underlies the immigration paradox . The welfare obj ec­
tive that is consistent with liberal egalitarian ideals, however, is 
cosmopolitan rather than nativist .  
Only the cosmopolitan interpretat ion of the original position offers 
a satisfactory framework for the evaluation of our immigration poli­
cies under a l iberal egalitarian theory of justice. This cosmopolitan 
perspective is the only interpretation of the original position that is 
faithful to ' 'the underlying spirit of Rawls ' theory," which "is animated 
by the underlying idea of eliminating or compensating for 'morally 
arbitrary' differences between people. ''64 Cosmopolitan liberals note 
that "the fact that one is an i nhabitant of one particular country rather 
than another . . .  is a paradigmatic example of the sort of 'morally 
arbitrary' fact that the method of the original position is  designe d  to 
abstract from. ' '65 To restrict the scope of our theory of justice based 
on such morally arbitrary facts undermines our claim to a liberal egali­
tarian theory of justice. 
The cosmopolitan perspective would imply not only more generous 
transfer policies but also more liberal admission policies for unskilled 
immigrants than the nativist perspective would imply.66 Joseph 
Carens addresses the issue of immigration restrictions as a question of 
social justice using a cosmopolitan interpretat ion of Rawls ' s  original 
position .fi7 In seeking a justification for the exclusion of al iens ,  he  sug­
gests ,  "we don 't  want to be biased by self-interested or partisan con­
siderations" and instead ' 'can take i t  as a basic presupposition  that we 
should treat all human beings, not just members of our own society, as 
free and equal moral persons. ' '68 Carens identifies this premise as a 
63 .  I Lbc the term " nativist" h rc cc to refe r  t•J " t he practice or policy of favoring native-born 
citizens a s  against immigrants. · ·  W E HSTEi-:. · :, N uv W o R L D  D I CTIONARY OF T H E  AMER ICAN LAN­
c; t ' A ( ; E  9-\7 ( D av id B. Gurainik c�cl. l ll 7 6 ) .  
6-l.  Woodw<�rd. surru note 5 l . a t  :)( ) . 2\  I .  In  t h is �c:r:sc:. Rawls 's  fai l ure to extend his  principles 
globally is " a n  ad !we move" t h a t  is "inconsistent �Ai t h  t h e  underlying egali tar ian spirit of his 
theory. " !d. at 76. 
!):) M a t  76. 
611. See Howard F. Chang. Lihemli::ed lnunigrarion us Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the 
Oprin wl !nunigmrion Policv. l -+5 \.. : . P A .  L. RE\ . l l -+7 .  ! 229-38 ( 1 997 ) .  
67 .  See Joseph H .  Carens.  A liens u n d  Cili::n 1s: Th e Cuse (iH Open Borders. 49  REv .  PoL. 25 1 .  
25.'1 ( 1 9:-\7) .  
6 8 .  !d. n t  2.'16 .  
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basic feature of all liberal poli tical theories ,69 concluding that we 
should ' ' take a globaL not a nationaL view of the original position. ''70 
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then immigration 
barriers are morally suspect and demand justification.  Al l  immigra­
tion restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their alien­
age . Most aliens are born aliens because our nationality laws deem 
them to be aliens based on immutable characteristics, including the 
geographic location of their birth ( that is ,  national origin)  and the citi­
zenship of their parents at the time of their birth.7 1  For a liberal soci­
ety that declares that " all men are created equal, ' '72 this discrimination 
based explicitly on circumstances of birth is at odds with ideal princi­
ples of social justice .73 National origin would appear to be a trait that 
Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view. "74 Carens 
concludes that we cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that 
those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens 
were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born else­
where or of alien parents ."75 Nor can we justify restrictions ' 'on the 
grounds that immigration would reduce the economic well-being of 
current citizens ."76 Similarly, in a util itarian calculation of global wel­
fare, "current citizens would enjoy no privileged position .  "77 Carens 
and others conclude from these l iberal premises that · 'we have an obli­
gation to open our borders much more fully than we do now."78 
69. See id. a t  265 (claiming t h a t  " 'our social inst i tu tions and public pol ic ies must respect a l l  
human beings a s  moral persons . . .  w h i c h  " e nt a i ls recogni tion . . .  of the freedom and equa l i t y  of 
every human being"):  see also id. a t  269 ( " No moral  argument  wil l  seem acceptable . . .  i f  i t  
direct ly chall enges t h e  assumption of t h e  equal  moral worth of a l l  individuals . " ). 
70. !d. at 256. 
7 1 .  See U.S. CoNST. amen d. XIV. � 1 ( " " A l l  persons bo rn . . .  i n  the U n i t e d  S t at es . and subject  
t o  the j urisdiction t hereof. are ci t izens of the U nited States . . . .  · · ) :  8 U.S. C. � l-+01 ( 2000 ) (setting 
forth categories of ' 'citizens of the United States a t  birth " ) .  
72 .  T H E  D EcLA RATION o F  INDEPEN D ENCE para.  2 ( U . S . 1 77o) .  
73. See Howa rd F.  Chang. Jmm igrarion Polin·. L iheruf Principles. a n d  1he Rcpuhlicon Tradi­
tion.  85 GEo. L.J. 2 1 05. 2 1 1 2- 1 5  ( 1 997 ) :  Roge r  N e t t .  The Civil Riglu vVc A re 1'ior Read\' For: The 
Righi of Free Movement of Peop fr: on rhe Fucr: 1!f rh c F.arrh . 8 1  ETH ICS 2 1 2 .  224 ( I  Y7 1 )  ( " May we 
expect the lesson which the Negro has tilUf:ht h i s  fel low Americans about denial  of fair opportu­
n it ies t o  b e  repeated on a broader scale.  with the unde rprivi leged of the eanh de mandi ng ·deseg­
regation' of nation s ta tes') " ) .  
7 4 .  RAWLS. supra note 5 2 .  a t  72. 
75.  Carens. supra note 67. a t  2G l .  
76. !d. at 262.  
77 .  !d. at 263 ( " [T ] he ut i li tari an commitment  to moral  eq ual i ty  is rcflectc:d in the assumption 
that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when ut i l i ty is  ca lculated . " ) .  
7 8 .  !d. at 270. Carens condemns immigra tion restrictions: · 'Like fe udal  b a rri e rs t o  mobil i ty .  
they protect  unj ust privil e ge . "  !d. S imi larlv. B ruce Ackerman concl ude� t h a t  immigration barri­
ers are inconsis tent  w i t h  l iberal  principles :  . .  I cannot j ust ify my power to exclude you \Vi thout 
destroying my own claim to m e mbership i n  2111 ide a l l iberal sta t e . "  B r:: t •ct= A. Ac:; E R�tAI".  So­
C I A L  JuSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 ( 1 9i'0 ) .  
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VI. PoLITICAL FEASI B I L ITY AND SECOND-B EsT PoLICIES 
Given the failure of most citizens to adopt this cosmopolitan per­
spective , however, cosmopolitan liberals face a constraint of political 
feasibility that prevents realization of all their ideals .  As a matter of 
political reality, the interests of citizens have in fact played a dominant 
role in the public debate over immigration policies .  N ational govern­
ments, including that of the U nited States , will likely continue to deem 
the promotion of its own citizens as the paramount obj ective of immi­
gration policies .79 This feature of the real world may impose a con­
straint on the set of policy alternatives open to us as a practical 
matter.80 
The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access both 
to our labor market and to public benefits and citizenship. As a mat­
ter of political reality, however, incumbent citizens are unlikely to ad­
mit unskilled aliens under those generous conditions in  the numbers 
that cosmopolitan ideals would require, given the fiscal  b urden that 
those liberal policies would entail . As long as citizens are limited in 
their willingness to bear this burden, they are likely to restrict alien 
access to immigrant visas. 
The self-interest of citizens is bound to impose constraints of politi­
cal feasibility on the availability of immigrant visas. These constraints 
are l ikely to exclude many unskilled aliens from the U .S .  l abor market 
unless they either are willing to immigrate illegally or have access to 
guest-worker visas. Given these constraints , cosmopolitan l iberals 
face a trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor markets 
for unskilled alien workers will likely require some restrictions on ac­
cess to public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic chance of 
enactment.8l Under these circumstances, guest-worker programs may 
represent the only alternative to exclusion for many aliens. 
79. See. e.g. . S .  R E P. N o .  98-62. a t  3-4 ( l9K3 ) ( ' ' [T] h e  paramount o b l iga t i o n  of any n a t i o n ' s  
government.  indeed the very reason for i ts existe nce and the j ustification for i ts  powe r.  i s  to 
promote t h e  national  i n t e rest-the l ong-term welfare of the maj ority of i t s  c i t izens and their  
descen d a n ts .. .  ) . 
80. See Louis Michael  Seidman. Feor und Loa!hing a1 1he Border. in JusTICE tN L '-trvt i G RA.TION. 
Sl!fiUl note -+3 . 3t ! 30. 1 40 (not ing that the l i mitat ions imposed by .. hounded caring· ·  are . .. l ike i t  
u r  n o t .  . . . facts t h a t  exis t  i n  t h e  world . .  a n d  ' · Lmlikely t o  change more than margin a l ly i n  t h e  near 
future ." so that  iln y  .. r,� a l - world i m m igration pol icy must  . . take accou n t  of these facts  and work 
around them") .  
81. Recognizing the p o l i t ical  con troversy generated by proposals to grant  access to cit izen­
s h i p. Mexico has also e m phasized an expanded guest-worker program i n  its nego t ia t ions with  the 
B ush administration and has been carefu l  n o t  to press the issue o f  cit ize nship.  B y  main taining 
tlexi bil i ty o n  this  issue.  Mexico seeks. as t h e  M exican foreign m i n i s t e r  Jorge Castaneda p u t  it .  .. as 
many rights as possible.  for as many Mexicans ( in t h e  U n i t e d  States)  as pc--� ib le .  as soon as 
possib l e "  within the const n ints  of p o l i t ical  feasibi l i ty .  Robert  Coll ier.  !v/ome1 o � un Gro11'S ro Le-
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If so, cosmopolitan liberals must settle for second-best policies that 
fall short of their ideals. For many unskilled alien workers, legaliza­
tion as guest workers may be the best one can achieve under current 
circumstances. Guest-worker programs may be incompatible with lib­
eral egalitarian ideals, as Woodward notes, but as Carens and others 
have argued, the exclusion of aliens is also incompatible with these 
ideals. If political realities require us to choose between these two 
departures from our liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can Wood­
ward justify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the alien as 
well as on natives?s2 
Ironically, Woodward himself notes that if we act against a "back­
ground of non-ideal institutions and behaviour'' in a world ''in which 
large numbers of people and institutions fail to do what j ustice re­
quires," we may "acquire obligations which are different from those 
[we] would acquire under more perfectly just institutional arrange­
ments. "83 As Woodward states the theory of the second-best: 
It is not in general a defensible moral principle that if  i t  is  obligatory 
(or even a good thing) to do P under i deal ,  utopian circumstances. 
then i t  is  also obligatory (or even a good thing) to d o  P under the 
actual circumstances, no matter how far they may differ from the 
ideaL84 
Woodward advances this claim in defense of immigration restrictions .  
but as we have seen.  they could more plausibly justify restrictions on 
alien access to public benefits and to citizenship. Indeed, Woodward 
himself notes that "it is far from obvious that it would be wrong . . .  to 
limit e ligibility for social welfare programmes to citizens or long-term 
residents, if failure to do so would jeopardize the continued existence 
of such programmes. ' '85 We might say the same about restrictions on 
alien access to public benefits and citizenship if these restrictions are 
necessary to make politically feasible the alien 's  access to our labor 
market and the alien 's admission in the first place . 
ga!i::e 1\!ligran ts. S . F. CHRON .. Ju ly 1 6 .  2001 . at A I .  As one Mexican negotiator explained. "we 
. . .  have to be very realist ic ." Alfredo Corchado. Fox Pushes for a More Open Border. D A LLAS 
l'v1o RNING NEws. July 16. 200 1. at  1A Castaneda h as explained tha t  access to ci t izenship "is not 
something of h uge significance to us .
. .  
Ivlunoz. supra note 50. at M3.  
82. See J u LI AN L. S r tvi O N .  T H E  EcoNOMIC CoNS E Q U E NCEs O F  IMMIG RATION 302-03. 3 10 
( 1 989) ( arguing that  a guest-worker program is better than a policy of exclusio n ) :  sec u!su Seid­
man. supra note 80.  a t  1 43 ( .. Why should anyone bel ieve that a guest  worker is ·exploi ted"  when 
he  receives higher wages and more protection in  the program than he  would receive if he re­
mained in his home country ?"" ) .  
83. Woodward. supra note 5 1 .  a t  78. 
84. !d. at  77. 
85 .  !d. at 79.  
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These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal al ­
ternatives, both of which fall short of our moral ideals. In  this regard, 
teleological moral theories have an advantage over deontological the­
ories .  Under a teleological theory, "those institutions and acts are 
right which of the available alternatives produce the most good. "86 
Once we specify the good, then a teleological theory can provide a 
complete ranking of all alternatives, including non-ideal alternatives.87 
Deontological theories, which do not maximize a good specified  in  
advance,88 may not  readily provide a ranking of non-ideal 
alternatives.89 
We might, for example ,  specify the good as an appropriate measure 
of social welfare,  one based on the satisfaction of preferences but ex­
cluding those preferences that violate our liberal principles of equal­
ity. Ronald Dworkin, for example ,  has proposed such a teleological 
theory.90 If we apply this type of consequentialism and adopt a cos­
mopolitan perspective, then a guest-worker program represents the 
lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclusion.  
Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its distri­
but ion,  whereas a guest-worker program would improve social welfare 
on both counts by increasing labor mobility.9 1 
Thus , from a consequentialist perspective that extends equal con­
cern to al iens and natives, expanded guest-worker programs represent 
an improvement over the status quo alternative of exclusion. There­
fore ,  cosmopolitan liberals should support l iberalizing reforms that in­
clude guest-worker programs, even while seeking the broadest rights 
possible for aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While 
it would be a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a 
liberal egalitarian perspective , i t  would also be  a mistak e  to sacrifice 
worthwhile reforms because they fall short of the ideal .  
K 6 .  RAWLS. supra note 5 2 .  a t  24. 
S7. See RoBIN B oADWAY & NEIL  B RUCE, WELFARE E coNOMICS 34 ( 1984) (defining a '"com­
plete" ordering):  JoHN voN NEUMANN & OsKAR MoRC>ENSTER.N,  THEORY oF GAMES AND E co­
N C J M I <  B E H AVIOR 26 (3d  ed. 1 953)  ( same ) .  
::\8. See RAWLS, supra note 52. a t  30. 
89. Sec id. at 303 (suggesting that "we may be able to find no satisfactory answer at all" in 
" instances of nonideal theory" ) . 
90. See R oNALD D woRKIN.  TAKING RIGHTS S ERIOl'SLY 234-38 ( 1 977 ) .  I have outlined a sim­
ilar theorv. which I call . .  l iberal consequentialism. '' See Howard F. Chang. A Liberal Theory of 
Social 'vVe/f!trc: Fairness. Utility. and the Pareto Princip le. 1 10 YALE L.J . 1 73 .  1 95-96 (2000) .  
9 1 .  Sec Bob Hamilton & John Whal ley.  Efficiencv and Distributional Implications of G!obci/ 
Rc.\ Erictions on Labour t'vlohilitv. 1 4  J. D Ev. Ec-c>N. 6 1 .  70-74 ( 1 984) . 
